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Abstract: The aim of  this essay is to analyze the concept of  acquain-
tance in the philosophy of  Bertrand Russell. First, Russell’s epistemo-
logical program and works are presented in a general manner. Then, 
the concept of  acquaintance is defined and characterized, as well as the 
so-called principle of  acquaintance. After that, acquaintance is placed 
in Russell’s epistemology as the core of  his theory of  knowledge. Fi-
nally, I will make some critical remarks concerning the role of  acquain-
tance in Russell’s epistemological framework. 
Keywords: Principle of  Acquaintance, perception, knowledge, sense-
data, physical object.
   UNA BREVE RESEÑA DE LA NOCIÓN DE                  
‘ACQUAINTANCE’ DE RUSSELL
Resumen: El objetivo de este ensayo es analizar el concepto de acquain-
tance en la filosofía de Bertrand Russell. Primero, el programa episte-
mológico y las obras de Russell se presentan de manera general. Luego, 
se define y caracteriza el concepto de acquaintance, así como el llama-
do principio de acquaintance. Después de eso, el concepto se enmarca 
en la epistemología de Russell como el núcleo de su teoría del conoci-
miento. Finalmente, haré algunos comentarios críticos sobre el papel 
del concepto en el marco epistemológico de Russell.
Palabras clave: Principio de Acquiantance, percepción, conocimiento, da-
tos sensoriales, objeto físico.
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1. Introduction
Russell’s epistemological inquiry is a reflection of  the stru-
ggle between two theses, namely, realism and empiricism. As 
Miah1 suggests, Russell’s epistemology “is a form of  empiricism 
in that all knowledge of  what exists must come directly or indi-
rectly from experience”, and it also “is a form of  realism in that 
the object known is independent of  being known”2. In other 
words, as Ayer3 puts it, Russell “takes it for granted that all our 
knowledge of  the world is derived from sense-perception, and 
he also assumes that ‘the things that are immediately known in 
sensation’4 are not straightforwardly identifiable with the physi-
cal objects which we ordinarily think that we perceive”5. Across 
Russell’s works, we see that his arguments and concerns are 
guided by the alleged contradictory nature of  those two theses. 
Thus, I will start by showing the basic elements that motivate his 
epistemological enterprise.
 Among the many different projects that Russell pursued 
over his extended philosophical works, there is one which caught 
his attention for many years, i.e. the possibility of  knowledge. 
Generally, it is assumed that knowledge is grounded on simple 
‘atoms’ which then compose complex ‘particles’; Russell’s logical 
atomism is evidence enough of  this assumption. Of  these two 
main sources of  knowledge, what seems more interesting and 
difficult to justify is the inferred knowledge that derives from 
them. Russell’s approach, in relation to inferred knowledge, is 
clearly reductive, in the sense that it must be possible to ex-
plain any questionable entity in terms of  a more fundamental 
one. Thus, according to Russell6, an ordinary physical object, for 
example, may be defined as:
1  Miah, S., Russell’s theory of  perception: 1905-1919, London, Continuum, 2006.
2  Miah, Russell’s theory of…, cit., p. 1.
3  Ayer, A.J., Russell, London, The Woburn Press, 1974.
4  Ayer is making reference to Russell, B., The Problems of  Philosophy, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1998 (1912), p. 4.
5  Ayer, Russell…, cit., p. 72.
6  Russell, B., Our Knowledge of  the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in 
Philosophy, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1949 (1914).
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…a certain series of  appearances, connected with each other by 
continuity and by certain causal laws. […] More generally, a “thing” 
will be defined as a certain series of  aspects, namely those which 
would commonly be said to be of  the thing. To say that a certain 
aspect is an aspect of  a certain thing will merely mean that it is one 
of  those which, taken serially, are the thing7. 
The reason for this is that “our world is not wholly a mat-
ter of  inference. There are things that we know without asking 
the opinion of  men of  science”8. These ‘things’ are what Russell 
calls ‘data’, ‘sense data’, or ‘sensibilia’, and the use of  the different 
words correspond to the changes in his view mentioned earlier; 
I will not pay much attention to these details in this essay. What 
we should consider in the reductive spirit of  Russell’s approach 
is the idea that inferred knowledge could be logically constructed 
in this sense. Accordingly, as Irvine9 says,
It is in this context that Russell also introduces his famous dis-
tinction between two kinds of  knowledge of  truths: that which 
is direct, intuitive, certain and infallible, and that which is indi-
rect, derivative, uncertain and open to error. […] Eventually, 
Russell supplemented this distinction between direct and indirect 
knowledge of  truths with his equally famous distinction between 
knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description10.
This distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and 
knowledge by description will be the center of  the following dis-
cussion, and we will pay close attention to the nature of  acquain-
tance, as well as to the principle that Russell puts forward as the 
basis for the construction of  his theory of  perception, the Prin-
ciple of  Acquaintance (PA).
7  Russell, Our Knowledge of…, cit., p. 111-112.
8  Russell, B., My Philosophical Development, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1959, 
p. 23.
9  Irvine, A.D., «Bertrand Russell», In E.N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of  Phi-
losophy, 2015. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/en-
tries/russell/
10  Irvine, «Bertrand Russell»…, cit.
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2. The notion of  acquaintance
Russell’s epistemological distinction between knowledge by 
acquaintance and knowledge by description depends, in great 
part, on the results of  On Denoting11 and, generally, on his theory 
of  meaning. This is the reason why some interpreters, as Clark12, 
take Russell’s epistemology as a semantic consequence of  the 
formal device developed in On Denoting, the one known as the 
theory of  descriptions. In this essay, I will not address the theory 
of  descriptions, though it is important to keep it in mind.
 In his Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Descrip-
tion13, Russell settles the basis for his latter epistemological work, 
which is grounded on the notion of  acquaintance and the so-
called Principle of  Acquaintance (PA). There, Russell says that:
There are two sorts of  knowledge: knowledge of  things, and 
knowledge of  truths. […] Knowledge of  things, when it is of  the 
kind we call knowledge by acquaintance, is essentially simpler than 
any knowledge of  truths, and logically independent of  knowledge 
of  truths […] Knowledge of  things by description, on the con-
trary, always involves, […], some knowledge of  truths as its source 
and ground14.
In On Denoting, Russell presupposed this distinction, but 
he did not provide clear definitions to sustain the epistemolo-
gical distinction15. As the passage above indicates, knowledge 
may come from two sources, things and truths, and knowled-
ge of  things may come by acquaintance or by description16. A 
few lines after the passage, Russell writes: “All our knowledge, 
11  Russell, B., «On Denoting», Mind, 14(56), 1905, pp. 479-493.
12  Clark, R., «Acquaintance», Synthese, 46(2), 1981, pp. 231-246.
13  Russell, B., «Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description», In 
R.E. Egner, & L.E. Denonn (eds.), Bertrand Russell: The Basic Writings of  Bertrand 
Russell, London, Routledge, 2009 (1912), pp. 191-198.
14  Russell, «Knowledge by Acquaintance…, cit., p. 191.
15  Cf. Russell, «On Denoting»…, cit., p. 479-480, 492.
16  Concerning knowledge of  truths, we can make another distinction between in-
tuitive knowledge of  truths and derivative knowledge of  truths, but this distinc-
tion does not concern my main objective (Cf. Russell, The Problems of…, cit., pp. 
64-81), because we are interested in the role played by acquaintance in Russell’s 
epistemology.
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both knowledge of  things and knowledge of  truths, rests upon 
acquaintance as its foundation”17. Thus, in order to understand 
how Russell builds his epistemology, we must pay close attention 
to acquaintance, insofar as it is the main source from which all 
possible knowledge originates and, as Miah claims, “[t]he con-
cept of  ‘acquaintance’ is fundamental to his whole approach to 
the problem of  perception and the relation of  perception to 
physical objects”18. But, what is acquaintance?
 In Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description, af-
ter the passage quoted above, Russell says that “we have acquain-
tance with anything of  which we are directly aware, without the 
intermediary of  any process of  inference or any knowledge of  
truths”19. Acquaintance provides us with a kind of  knowledge of  
which we are “immediately conscious”, and that is perfect and 
complete. But, more importantly, we must see that acquaintance 
is a relation between a subject and an object, and not a third 
element between the subject and the object; which is obvious by 
the fact that it does not depend on any “process of  inference or 
any knowledge of  truths”. According to Miah, we can enumerate 
some of  the main features of  the notion of  acquaintance.
i. Acquaintance is a dual relation “between a cognizing 
subject and an object cognized […] The subject is an entity 
acquainted with something (an object) and the object is also an 
entity with which something is acquainted”20. It is worth noting 
that Russell is not committing the relation of  acquaintance to any 
specific ontology, insofar as he is just considering the subject and 
the object as entities, but he is not explicitly stating the nature of  
those entities. As Russell himself  claims, “acquaintance is a dual 
relation between a subject and an object which need not have any 
community of  nature”21.
17  Russell, «Knowledge by Acquaintance…, cit., p. 192.
18  Miah, Russell’s theory of…, cit., p. 3.
19  Russell, «Knowledge by Acquaintance…, cit., p. 191.
20  Miah, Russell’s theory of…, cit., p. 10-11.
21  Russell, B., Theory of  Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript, London, Routledge, 1992 
(1984), p. 5.
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ii. Acquaintance is the “most pervading aspect of  
experience”22. This means that experience itself  is a relation, 
again, between a subject and an object. But, as Miah says, “Rus-
sell employs the terms ‘acquaintance’ and ‘awareness’ synony-
mously in place of  ‘experience’”23, and this suggests that there is 
some degree of  vagueness in the use of  these terms, insofar as 
the definition of  acquaintance cited above includes direct aware-
ness as a feature of  acquaintance.
iii. Acquaintance cannot be erroneous. This is a fundamen-
tal feature of  acquaintance that derives from the fact that it is a 
form of  direct knowledge of  the object. In The Problems of  Philo-
sophy, Russell says that “[w]hatever we are acquainted with must 
be something; we may draw wrong inferences from our acquain-
tance, but the acquaintance itself  cannot be deceptive”24, also, in 
Theory of  Knowledge, Russell states that “when we are acquainted 
with an object, there certainly is such an object, and the pos-
sibility of  error is logically excluded”25. It is important to keep 
in mind that the description of  any object of  acquaintance is 
subject to having a truth value, but this does not mean that the 
relation of  acquaintance is also subject to having a truth value.
iv. There are no degrees of  acquaintance. In Our Knowledge 
of  the External World, Russell asserts that “[i]t is a mistake to speak 
as if  acquaintance had degrees: there is merely acquaintance and 
non-acquaintance. […] it is a mistake to say that if  we were per-
fectly acquainted with an object we should know all about it”26.
In Miah’s presentation there are many other features attri-
buted to acquaintance, but in my opinion they could be deduced 
from the ones presented here. One interesting fact about Miah’s 
analysis is that the notion of  acquaintance is dispersed across 
Russell’s works, which is a sign that the notion itself  was not 
entirely clear in Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Descrip-
22  Ibid.
23  Miah, Russell’s theory of…, cit., p. 12.
24  Russell, The Problems of…, cit., p. 69.
25  Russell, Theory of  Knowledge…, cit., p. 49.
26  Russell, Our Knowledge of…, cit., p. 151.
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tion or, at least, Russell had to make several modifications and 
additions to it.
It seems that the notion of  acquaintance is sufficient to ser-
ve Russell’s purpose, except that so far I have not said anything 
about the kind of  things with which we can have acquaintance. 
I intentionally left this issue aside because I take it that this is a 
highly problematic and weak aspect of  the notion.
In On Denoting, Russell says that “[i]n perception we have 
acquaintance with the objects of  perception, and in thought 
we have acquaintance with objects of  a more abstract logical 
character”27. But, what are the objects of  perception and what 
are those more abstract objects?
We have acquaintance in sensation with the data of  the outer sen-
ses, and in introspection with the data of  what may be called the 
inner sense –thoughts, feelings, desires, etc.; we have acquaintance 
in memory with things which have been data either of  the outer 
senses or of  the inner sense. Further, it is probable, though not 
certain, that we have acquaintance with Self, as that which is aware 
of  things or has desires towards things.
In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things, we 
also have acquaintance with what we shall call universals, that is to 
say, general ideas, such as whiteness, diversity, brotherhood, and so on28.
According to this passage, we have acquaintance with the 
data from a) sensation, b) introspection, and c) memory. We may 
also have acquaintance with the Self; although Russell was never 
fully convinced of  this, as it is obvious from the passage. Finally, 
we have acquaintance with universals. The knowledge of  uni-
versals may, also be thought of  as problematic, in the sense that 
what counts as universal is one of  the greatest problems in philo-
sophy. Nonetheless, we can think that the source of  the Self  and 
of  universals could be one of  the three main sources mentioned 
at the beginning of  the passage. Thus, following Miah, “the ob-
27  Russell, «On Denoting»…, cit., p. 479.
28  Russell, The Problems of…, cit., p. 28.
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jects to which we can have a relation of  acquaintance include 
particulars, universals and logical forms”29.
 In Russell’s view, the objects of  sensation are called sen-
se-data, and “they supply the most obvious and striking exam-
ple of  knowledge by acquaintance”30. They are, so to speak, the 
paradigm of  acquaintance. In The Problems of  Philosophy, Russell 
states that they are “the things that are immediately known in 
sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, 
roughnesses, and so on”, and, also, he says that sensation is “the 
experience of  being immediately aware of  these things”31. In ge-
neral terms, we can say that “sense-data is what is immediately 
given by the senses”32. However, the notion of  ‘sense-data’ is 
not constant in Russell’s epistemological works, and he even de-
cided to set it aside in some of  his works. Among the problems 
related to this notion is the difficulty of  considering a ‘patch of  
colour’, to use one of  Russell’s examples, as something indepen-
dent from shape. There is also the problem of  considering this 
data as coming from the senses and not as properties of  ob-
jects, as is common to other philosophers. But this discussion 
is beyond my present objective. Generally speaking, sense-data 
are independent of  our sense-perception, insofar as they exist 
independently of  being perceived by a subject. Introspection, the 
second source of  knowledge by acquaintance, is also a kind of  
knowledge of  particulars, just like in the case of  sensation, but it 
refers to thought and feeling, “[w]e are not only aware of  things, 
but we are often aware of  being aware of  them”33. We could 
take this kind of  knowledge by acquaintance as the knowledge 
of  what goes on in our own minds.34 Finally, Russell says that we 
29  Miah, Russell’s theory of…, cit., p. 20.
30  Russell, «Knowledge by Acquaintance…, cit., p. 192.
31  Russell, The Problems of…, cit., p. 4.
32  Miah, Russell’s theory of…, cit., p. 20.
33  Russell, «Knowledge by Acquaintance…, cit., p. 193.
34  It is worth noting that, regarding this theoretical grounding of  Russell’s episte-
mology, it does not really matter what the mind is. So this issue is independent 
of  ontological considerations and the nature of  mind. Russell will make a stand 
on this issue and provide his own concept of  ‘mind’, but, at this stage, the issue 
simply does not arise.
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have knowledge by acquaintance in memory, the third main sou-
rce, and, as Russell puts it, it “is the source of  all our knowledge 
concerning the past”35. This way have an idea of  what the pos-
sible objects of  acquaintance are. Nevertheless, it must be said 
that this is not a fully developed explanation and the problems 
are plenty, some of  which where addressed by Russell himself36.
 Now, what happens, then, to knowledge by description? 
As Russell himself  stated, “All our knowledge, both knowledge 
of  things and knowledge of  truths, rests upon acquaintance as 
its foundation”37. Therefore, all the problems that the notion of  
acquaintance may have are inherited by knowledge by descrip-
tion. So, according to Baldwin38, we can ask ourselves if  acquain-
tance can hold the weight of  a full theory of  perception, since 
there are several hierarchical connections between knowled-
ge of  things and knowledge of  truths, all of  which depend on 
acquaintance. But, before evaluating the place of  acquaintance 
in Russell’s theory of  knowledge, I must make explicit the prin-
ciple that is supposed to hold his theory together and, in gene-
ral, his whole epistemological research, the so-called Principle 
of  Acquaintance (PA). One of  the clearer presentations of  the 
principle is found in The Problems of  Philosophy:
Every proposition which we can understand must be composed 
wholly of  constituents with which we are acquainted39.
This is precisely the principle which is supposed to hold the 
weight of  Russell’s theory of  knowledge. We can analyze the 
PA in two parts. First, all the components must be known by 
acquaintance and they must be grasped either by sensation, in-
trospection or memory, according to what was explained above. 
Second, the way in which the understanding of  a proposition is 
35  Russell, «Knowledge by Acquaintance…, cit., p. 192.
36  Cf. Ayer, Russell…, cit., pp. 72-87; Soames, S., The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy. 
Vol. 1: The Founding Giants, Princeton University Press, 2014, pp. 537-543.
37  Russell, «Knowledge by Acquaintance…, cit., p. 192.
38  Baldwin, T., «From Knowledge by Acquaintance to Knowledge by Causation», 
In N. Griffin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2003, pp. 421-422.
39  Russell, The Problems of…, cit., p. 32.
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analyzed is precisely that which is stated by Russell in On Denoting. 
So, once again, we see that Russell’s epistemology is delimited by 
his theory of  meaning and his theory of  descriptions.
 Seen from another perspective, the PA exhibits something 
else, concerning Russell’s biases. The PA expresses Russell’s em-
piricism in a very clear way, in the sense that it imposes a restric-
tion on the origin of  the basic and fundamental components of  
knowledge. In a certain way, the principle shows Russell’s general 
approach to philosophical problems, i.e., given a formal appara-
tus, the one stablished by his theory of  meaning, and given his 
empiricist bias, the kind of  objects which serve as fundamental 
elements of  knowledge are reduced to the notion of  acquaintan-
ce and the analysis of  any proposition that expresses knowledge 
of  the world is provided by Russell’s formal device. Neverthe-
less, Russell’s empiricism must confront the kind of  skepticism 
usually associated with every empiricist approach to knowledge. 
Even if  Russell claims that the objects of  acquaintance are inde-
pendent from the subject, their independence is something that 
is not obvious and, therefore, his theory of  knowledge must pro-
vide sufficient support for this claim of  independence. Precisely 
in this point is where Russell introduces his realism concerning 
the objects of  acquaintance, especially concerning sense-data. If  
sense-data are always what is perceived by a subject, then, at least 
in this sense, they must be private; which represents a great pro-
blem for any theory of  knowledge of  the external world. Conse-
quently, Russell had to explain how it is possible for sense-data 
to be the ground of  all of  our knowledge. In other words, the 
independence of  sense-data is one of  the main objectives that 
Russell needs to pursue in developing his theory of  knowledge.
 So far, we have seen that the notion of  acquaintance is 
the core of  Russell’s epistemology and that it is a relation bet-
ween a subject and an object. Taking it to be a relation and not 
a third element between the subject and the object can be seen 
as an improvement over other theories of  knowledge, but the 
difficulty of  defining the kinds of  objects which can be known 
by acquaintance weakens the project. Hence, there remains the 
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question whether acquaintance is able to support a full theory of  
knowledge.
3. Acquaintance, perception and the theory of  knowledge
Russell’s epistemology represents an effort to overcome the 
apparent contradiction between empiricism and realism. On one 
hand, empiricism leads to skepticism; which threatens any theory 
of  knowledge of  the external world. On the other hand, realism, 
as Russell’s sees it, can be a way out of  skepticism; but it must be 
clearly delimited, in order to avoid the inclusion of  certain ob-
jects, like the round square, as parts of  the world. The theory of  
descriptions is meant to play the role of  limiting Russell’s realism, 
by means of  the correct analysis of  propositions, the theory of  
perception is meant to play the role of  overriding skepticism. 
Allegedly, these two elements should settle the ground for a full 
theory of  knowledge. Thus, my next objective is to evaluate 
Russell’s theory of  perception in order to allow for the possibi-
lity of  a theory of  knowledge. Evidently, I cannot address every 
detail or even revise Russell’s vast works on this, but a brief  sche-
matic presentation will suffice my purpose. As a consequence, 
my strategy here will be to go from the objects of  acquaintance 
to the objects of  perception, i.e., from sense-data to the objects 
of  the external world.
 As noted in the previous section, the subject is only di-
rectly aware of  the objects of  acquaintance, i.e., sense-data. Also, 
according to Miah, Russell “thought that the sense-datum provi-
des a rock-bottom level of  certainty on which to anchor empiri-
cal knowledge”40. But, it is essential to make clear that sense-data 
are not objects in the common sense; which means that we do 
not perceive physical objects. As Miah puts it, “[w]hereas physi-
cal objects are such things as tables, chairs, houses, trees and the 
rest, sense-data are such things as visual appearances, sensations 
of  hardness, sounds, odours, etc.”41. Thus, in order to surpass 
40  Miah, Russell’s theory of…, cit., p. 50.
41  Ibid., p. 52.
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skepticism, Russell must provide an account of  how it is possible 
to have knowledge of  physical objects. In other words, Russell 
had to make a distinction between sense-data and our experience 
of  them, in order to guarantee their independence.
We shall give the name ‘sensation’ to the experience of  being im-
mediately aware of  these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour, 
we have a sensation of  the colour, but the colour itself  is a sense-
datum, not a sensation. The colour is that of  which we are imme-
diately aware, and the awareness itself  is the sensation. It is plain 
that if  we are to know anything about the table, it must be by 
means of  the sense-data –brown colour, oblong shape, smooth-
ness, etc.– which we associate with the table; but, […], we cannot 
say that the table is the sense-data, or even that the sense-data are 
directly properties of  the table42.
Sense-data must be independent of  our sensation of  them 
and, moreover, physical objects are not identical to sense-data. 
The properties of  physical objects are independent from sense-
data, even if  sense-data is the only way of  knowing physical ob-
jects, and are independent of  sensation. In other words, we are 
dealing with three different kinds of  elements that are constituti-
ve of  Russell’s theory of  perception: physical objects, sense-data 
and sensations. Thus, Russell’s objective is to explain the relation 
between sense-data and physical objects.
 In Russell’s view, we cannot directly perceive physical ob-
jects, but only sense data and, as Miah claims, “in any perceptual 
situation what we are immediately aware of  are sense-data”43. 
From this, we can conclude, with Miah, that “when I say that ‘x 
is a sense-datum’ what I mean is that I am immediately aware of  
x no matter whether x is a sense-datum of  something or not”44. 
But this, again, evidences the kind of  skeptical empiricism that 
Russell wants to evade, inasmuch as physical objects, being in-
dependent from sense-data, seem inaccessible to the subject. 
To overcome this problem, i.e., to guarantee the continuity of  
42  Russell, The Problems of…, cit., p. 4.
43  Miah, Russell’s theory of…, cit., p. 54.
44  Ibídem.
49
Luis G. Castro/ A Brief  Survey of  Russel´s Notion of  Acquaintance
physical objects beyond the momentary and private character of  
sense-data, Russell introduces the notion of  ‘sensibilia’:
I shall give the name sensibilia to those objects which have the 
same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data without ne-
cessarily being data to any mind. […] a sensibile becomes a sense-
datum by entering into the relation of  acquaintance45.
Sensibilia are supposed to overcome the aforementioned mo-
mentary and private character of  sense-data, in the sense that 
they are the kind of  things with which the subject has acquain-
tance. According to Miah, “all sense-data are sensibilia but not 
vice versa”, thus “a sense-datum is merely a sensible that stands 
to a person as an object of  acquaintance”46.
 With these elements, i.e., the relation of  acquaintance, 
sense-data, and sensibilia, Russell builds a theory of  perception 
that, as I have suggested, is fully based on the relation of  acquain-
tance. So, there are reasons to believe that this is precisely what 
Russell intended in passages like the following:
We have not the means of  ascertaining how things appear from 
places not surrounded by brain and nerves and sense-organs, be-
cause we cannot leave the body; but continuity makes it not un-
reasonable to suppose that they present some appearance at such 
places. Any such appearance would be included among sensibilia. 
If –per impossibile– there were a complete human body with no mind 
inside it, all those sensibilia would exist, in relation to that body, 
which would be sense-data if  there were a mind in the body. What 
the mind adds to sensibilia, in fact, is merely awareness: everything 
else is physical or physiological47.
Thus, we can assert that Russell’s theory of  perception is 
grounded in the notion of  ‘sensibilia’, which amounts to the kind 
of  objects with which the subject could enter in the relation 
of  acquaintance. In other words, since all possible knowledge 
comes from acquaintance and the objects of  acquaintance are 
sense-data, which are simply sensibilia that become sense-data to 
45  Russell, B., «The Relation of  Sense-data to Physics», In Mysticism and Logic, Bar-
nes & Noble Books, 1951 (1917), p. 110.
46  Miah, Russell’s theory of…, cit., p. 70. 
47  Russell, «The Relation of…, cit., p. 111.
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a subject through the relation of  acquaintance, then a full theory 
of  knowledge of  the external world would depend on the possi-
bility of  entering in the relation of  acquaintance with the objects 
of  the external world; with the addition of  a theory of  meaning, 
as I suggested above. This theory, Russell thought would have 
the power to overcome the skepticism generated by his empiri-
cist approach, though it would still have to justify the move from 
sensibilia to actual physical objects.
 With the passages, arguments and notions that I have 
analyzed so far, though there are many other important details 
that a full analysis would have to consider, I can support the 
claim that Russell’s epistemology has acquaintance as its keysto-
ne. Despite the many modifications and differences among his 
epistemological works, Russell maintained acquaintance as the 
fundamental source of  knowledge and, consequently, also the 
principle of  acquaintance, to which I made some reference in 
the previous section. Therefore, Russell’s epistemology, i.e., his 
theory of  perception and his theory of  the knowledge of  the ex-
ternal world, is grounded in the relation of  acquaintance, which 
was one of  my primary objectives in this essay. But, how can we 
evaluate Russell’s epistemology? In particular, can acquaintance 
support the weight of  a full theory of  knowledge?
4. Some critical remarks
Even if  we concede that acquaintance is a good starting 
point, compared to other approaches, Russell’s definition seems 
to be considerably weak, insofar as the delimitation of  the ob-
jects of  acquaintance is not sufficiently clear. Certainly, patches 
of  color, smells, and so on, are core elements of  perception, 
but the road from those things to physical objects is entangled 
and problematic. Russell’s epistemology is in need of  details and 
strong foundations, which make us think that acquaintance may 
not be a strong enough foundation. That which seems to be a 
good methodological approach to a logical analysis, i.e., logical 
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atomism, may not be suitable for such an epistemological enter-
prise as a full theory of  knowledge, because, even if  sense-data 
seem to be the simplest constituent of  our logical construction 
of  concepts and propositions about the external world, percep-
tion does not seem to be susceptible to such a fined-grained lo-
gical decomposition. Thus, it seems to me that acquaintance, as 
explained by Russell, is not able to provide sufficient foundation 
to a theory of  knowledge.
 It must be noted that my rejection of  Russell’s proposal 
is not a rejection of  acquaintance as the keystone of  all possible 
knowledge, but a rejection of  Russell’s characterization of  the 
notion. I agree to stablishing the connection between the subject 
and the object as a relation and not as a third element in between, 
but the kind of  relation that Russell uses seems too weak for its 
main purpose of  grounding epistemology.
 Another issue worth noting is that Russell’s methodolo-
gy, in analyzing perception, does not seem to be appropriate for 
epistemology. My reason for saying this is that logical analysis 
has a limited scope; it is a methodology which is applicable only 
in cases in which the extensions of  the concepts to which every 
element in a proposition belongs are clearly definable. If  we want 
to say that perception is composed out of  certain kinds of  ele-
ments, those elements do not seem to be analyzable as if  they 
were logical atoms.
 Finally, I would like to make some remarks on Russell’s 
epistemological project and, also, on the way in which Miah pre-
sented it. One fact that my brief  analysis of  acquaintance shows 
is that Russell’s epistemology is fragmented in several of  his 
works, some of  which I did not even mention here, and his argu-
ments and concepts are dispersed. This shows that his thinking 
suffered many different changes, probably due to some of  the 
problems that I mentioned in this essay. Thus, even if  we agree 
with Miah that Russell was focused on epistemological issues 
between 1905 and 1919, we have no reason to think that there 
is such thing as a single theory of  perception, nor of  knowledge 
of  the external world. As Miah claims, “there is more continuity 
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in Russell’s philosophy than is usually supposed”48, but I believe 
that the continuity is in his purpose and not in the development 
of  a theory. As I see it, the only constant in Russell’s epistemolo-
gical works is acquaintance but, besides that, we find fragments 
and attempts to surpass the many philosophical problems that 
arose along the way. Miah’s work is unquestionably detailed and 
extensive, but it also leaves the feeling that, in going back and 
forth through so many of  Russell’s works, he had to manipulate 
Russell’s reasoning, in order to account for the alleged continui-
ty49.
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48  Miah, Russell’s theory of…, cit., Preface, p. ix.
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